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"Maunqa marema - kudva routi waaoere1'1
Introduction
Unlike our usual annual Centre reports to the Association which 
summarize the year's activities, this one focusses on a single 
issue which is critical and urgent for your members. It gives 
a summary of our research insights on the issue, and unlike many 
academic reports it is categorical and unequivocal. As I did 
last year I shall reinforce the argument with the tsumo of the 
land, for as so often happens the product of good research is 
really an elaboration of the common sense and wisdom embedded in 
our tradition.
2. Back to Basics - The Parks and Wild Life Act
Today Zimbabwe has a reputation for having one of the most 
healthy wildlife populations in Africa. It is one of the most 
popular tourist destinations in the Continent and has a booming 
tourism industry which ranks third in sectoral contributions to 
our foreign currency revenues. Internationally it has been a 
pioneer in the environmental approach of "conservation through 
use" and a developing country leader in promoting this approach 
in such forums as CITES and the IUCN. This has won us the 
admiration of friends, the grudging recognition of achievement 
even among our opponents, and places a heavy responsibility on 
us.
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One of the major reasons for this success has been the philosophy 
behind the Parks and Wild Life Act (1975) which conferred the 
custodianship of wildlife on their land to the "owners or 
occupiers of alienated land." Very briefly, this philosophy 
contained insights on the use and management of wildlife which 
can be summarized as answers to the cruestions what? who? and 
why?:
What basic insights?
That in certain ecological contexts wildlife can be 
the most environmentally sound and economically 
productive form of land use.
Who should manage?
That the State does not have the resources to manage 
wildlife everywhere in Zimbabwe and that the most 
effective managers of wildlife are the people who live 
with it and pay for the costs of its existence.
Why should they manage Effectively?
That people who liye with wildlife will only use and 
manage it sustainably when there is an economic 
motivation to do so and when they have secure rights 
to manage and reap the full rewards of their 
management inputs.
These insights informed the policy behind the Act, which had the 
effect of making farms and ranchers into proprietorial wildlife 
units, combining 'ownership,' management, cost and benefit. 
Zimbabwean experience since 1975 has clearly demonstrated their 
validity. Contrary to some gloomy predictions, wildlife 
populations have increased on farms and ranches and the wildlife 
industry in this Country has boomed.
3. The CAMPFIRE Programme: Policy and Law
There was, however, a major defect in the 1975 Act. Enacted 
during U.D.I. era, it conferred proprietorship (or "Appropriate 
Authority") over wildlife only to the largely white farmers and 
ranchers. Small-scale black farmers, many of them living in the 
underdeveloped but wildlife-rich periphery of the Country, did 
not receive the priveleges and benefits of the Act. It was 
clearly discriminatory and in 1982 our Government amended the Act 
allowing the Minister to appoint a rural district council "to be 
the appropriate authority for such area of Communal Land as may 
be specified." (Section 95 (1)) The purpose of this amendment 
was to eliminate discrimination between farmers on private lands 
and communal land farmers and to extend the demonstrated economic 
and environmental benefits of the Act to communal land farmers. 
It was an important legal step forward, and formed the legal
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springboard on which the CAMPFIRE Programme was subsequently 
developed.
Our experience has shown, however, that the replication of the 
essential institutional profile providing success - the tight 
proprietorial unit combining ownership, management, cost and 
benefit - in the communal land context poses a number of 
problems. Among these are:
The tenure situation of communal land farmers is less 
secure and they are more vulnerable to planning and 
regulation imposed from outside their communities.
The appropriate proprietorial units analogous tg farms and 
ranches are communities (usually wards or videos) of 
collective interest: management is therefore more complex.
Legally these communities still do not have "appropriate 
authority." This has been granted to councils, which are 
large, heterogenous administrative units rather than units 
of production. Wildlife production comes from their sub­
units (videos or wards) , or some of them. These are the 
units which parallel farms and ranches, but they do not 
have the same position in law regarding the proprietorship 
of wildlife. Thus a legal discrimination between private 
farmers or ranchers and communal land farmers still 
persists in regard to wildlife.
In this legal context, it is not surprising that councils have 
been tempted, as the delegated legal authorities over wildlife, 
to appropriate the revenues of their constituent producer 
communities for their own purposes - thus replicating at the 
council level the extractive practices of the pre-CAMPFIRE, 
colonial government. We have been operating in an ambiguous 
situation-; the law saying one thing and our principles and policy 
demanding another.
As an interim measure, Government has tried to bridge this gap 
between law and policy by persuasion, indicating that it is 
Government's expectation that councils will further devolve their 
appropriate authority status to wards and communities. In his 
speech to the A.G.M. of this Association 15/7/91 the Honorable 
Senior Minister of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development 
stated that Government was satisfied that district councils were 
well placed to manage wildlife on their own lands provided that 
four conditions were met. These were that:
a) "Benefits are returned to the producer communities, that
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is, the people living with the animals in the respective 
area of the village, or ward."
b) "The producer communities decide for themselves how to 
allocate these benefits."
c) "That as much money as possible is ploughed back to the 
producer communities. This means that councils must 
institute effective management systems that eliminate 
excessive bureaucracies and overheads."
d) "That council and other management committees are 
responsible to the people they represent."
(Official Closing Address, pp. 3-4)
Similarly, the Honorable Minister for Environment and Tourism 
stated in his address to the A.G.M. of this Association 25/11/92 
that it was his Ministry's "intention to ensure that councils 
entrust producer communities with responsibility for managing 
benefits." He also continued, "In conclusion I wish by way of 
emphasis to re-state that it is my Ministry's intention to ensure 
that the process of devolution continues and that producer 
communities become increasingly involved in all aspects of 
wildlife management, especially the financial elements."
(pp. 2, 5)
As a guideline to the implementation of the Programme in this 
ambiguous legal situation the Department of National Parks and 
Wild Life Management issued recommendations on revenue 
distribution according to the following formula:
a) up to 35% of revenue to be retained for wildlife resource 
management by the district council's wildlife management 
agencies; b) a minimum of 50% of revenues to be distributed to 
wards; and c) 15% of gross revenues to be retained by district 
councils as a levy. Note that the last was, in effect, a 15% 
district council tax on producer community wildlife revenues.
4. CAMPFIRE : THE RECORD
Under these interim legal and programmatic arrangements the 
record of the CAMPFIRE Programme has been mixed. Sadly we have 
to acknowledge that too many councils have ignored Ministerial 
directives and the Department's guidelines. They have 
appropriated the bulk of the revenues generated by their ^ producer 
communities, made promises of revenue distributions to 
communities which they have not kept, marginalized^, any 
participation in wildlife planning and management by communities, 
created hypertrophic district-level wildlife management and 
failed to develop training programmes in management for their
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producer communities. The result has been ignorance Of or 
hostility to the CAMPFIRE Programme, mistrust of councils, 
increasing intolerance of wildlife and a continued lack of 
communal environmental controls. These effects are not the fault 
of the Programme's principles (as our detractors would have it) 
but the result of a lack of the Programme's proper 
implementation.
Fortunately we also have examples of district councils which have 
understood the dynamics of CAMPFIRE, have taken Ministerial 
directives seriously, and have genuinely promoted proprietorial 
devolution to producer communities. Where this has been 
implemented in communities over a period long enough for us to 
make informed judgements the following results are discernable:
A re-awakened appreciation of the value of wildlife 
Poaching eliminated or drastically reduced 
Fewer complaints of problem animals
The emergence of local environmental management structures
Improved environmental conservation practices
The use of wildlife revenues for food security in times of
drought
The local initiation of land use planning 
An increase in household revenues
Community-funded local development for schools, clinics, 
grinding mills and other community infrastructure
These are the success stories of CAMPFIRE. These communities are 
the exemplars whose experience can and should be replicated in 
many others. They are real-life, on-the-ground demonstrations 
of the validity of Zimbabwe's "conservation through use" policy. 
They are evolving, dynamic evidence that local communities can 
manage their environment effectively and can turn it into an 
instrument of local development and self-sufficiency. Their 
success deserves support, not suppression.
5. Amalgamation and the New Rural District Councils
Unfortunately there are several dangers which could suppress the 
success of these communities. This paper focuses on one: 
amalgamation and the new rural district councils.
Like the 1982 amendment to the Parks and Wild Life Act, the 
amalgamation of district councils and rural councils has among 
its, objectives the removal of residual legal discrimination in 
rural Zimbabwe between private farmers or ranchers and farmers 
in communal lands. This is a commendable objective, and 
amalgamation provides the opportunity for large scale commercial
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fanners and communal land farmers to coordinate their planning 
and management of natural resources. However there are currently 
alarming reports that the new rural district councils, in an era 
of ESAP and under the imperative from Government to be self­
financing, intend to use their communal land wildlife revenues 
to balance their budgets. These district councils in effect, are 
looking on their communarl^land wildlife as a "common pool" 
resource.
One can have a certain understanding for the administrators and 
council executives who aidvocate this return to an older, 
paternalistic policy on communal land wildlife. For seme 
districts, wildlife constitutes their most valuable, readily 
encashable resource. Why not manage it, use its revenues to^ 
balance council budgets, and then paternalistically return some 
°f it to producer communities for their "development"? 
Understandably they are also nervous about devolving their 
appropriate authority to wards and videos when the law makes them 
statutorily respgnsible for wildlife. If sub-district officials 
mismanage wildlife or misappropriate wildlife revenues, will they 
be held liable in law?
These are real dilemmas which must be addressed. But the way out 
of them is not a return to older, paternalistic policies on 
wildlife. A scenario in which communal land wildlife revenues 
are now appropriated by the new rural district councils would 
have disastrous implications:
An uncertainty about their proprietorial rights would be 
reintroduced in these communities.
An inevitable drop in direct wildlife revenues to these 
communities.
Motivation to collectively manage and use natural resources 
in these communities would fall while motivations for 
private exploitation of these resources (poaching) would 
increase.
Conflicts between producer communities and councils will 
rise, with a vast escalation in complaints about 
"council's" problem animals. Communal land farmers will no 
longer tolerate a system where they pav the costs for the 
existence of wildlife while others reap the benefits of its 
value. Kusiri kwako masango~^
Indeed this scenario could set the stage for the death of 
CAMPFIRE. It would be a blow to Zimbabwe's conservation
objectives and to the Country's tourism and wildlife industry.
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It would damage Zimbabwe's leadership internationally in its role 
as a proponent of conservation through use. It would reinforce 
accusations that Zimbabwe's policies of devolution in wildlife 
management are a fraud.
Finally, it would reintroduce older discriminations between 
communal land farmers and private commercial farmers. In rural 
district councils with both private and communal lands, council 
appropriation of communal land wildlife revenues while private 
land wildlife revenues remain the property of the land owner 
would be highly discriminatory. It would constitute in effect 
a transfer of assets from communal lands to private lands, from 
the rural poor to the rural rich.
Such a scenario is completely unacceptable. Environmentally it 
would erode Zimbabwe,s policies for sound, sustainable use and 
management of natural resources at decentralized levels. 
Developmentally it would be a setback to rural self-sufficiency 
and self-management in communal lands, reintroducing 
paternalistic notions of dependency and aid which denigrate the 
abilities of communities and cannot satisfy their drive to stand 
on their own efforts. Mvura vokuchererwa haioedzi nvota. 3 
Politically it resurrects suspicions in rural people of elite 
intentions to expropriate their resources and control their 
lives. Mweni haaiswi padura 4
6. The Wav Forward
Such a scenario cannot be allowed to develop, and furthermore the 
legal ambiguities which characterize this present phase in the 
implementation of our policies must be eliminated. I suggest 
that the time has now come for the following steps to be taken:
a) Our parliamentarians and bureaucrats must be made fully 
aware of the environmental, developmental and political 
implications involved. The CAMPFIRE Association has a 
central role to play in this and I urge you to address this 
responsibility as a matter of urgency.
b) Our legislation needs to be updated to harmonize our policy 
with the law. The intent of our policy is no longer simply 
"to confer priviledges on owners or occupiers of alienated 
land as custodians of wild life, fish and plants" as the 
1975 Preamble puts it; it is to confer priviledges on 
occupiers of land, whether private or communal. as 
custodians of wild life, fish and plants. I repeat, our 
legislation should be non-discriminatory between communal 
land and private farmers on matters of wildlife management 
and use. In rural district councils the legal
proprietorial status of producer communities in communal 
lands regarding wildlife must be the same as that of
7
private farms and ranches. Section 95(1) of the Act should 
therefore be amended to read: "The Minister may, by notice 
in the Gazette, appoint a rural district council, or any 
properly constituted sub-unit thereof, to be the 
appropriate authority for such area of Communal Land as may 
be specified in such notice.” (Or other wording to the 
same effect.)
7 ■ Rural District Council Revenues and Wildlife Resources
This analysis has recognised that rural district councils are 
under the imperative to balance their budgets and that for many 
of them the wildlife industry provides a significant part of the 
economy of the areas they service. It follows therefore that 
wildlife revenues are likely to constitute an important part of 
the tax base that they require. However in taxing wildlife 
revenues the following points should be considered:
a) The rural district councilx taxation system should be 
equitable and not tax communal land wildlife revenues more 
heavily than similar production on private land.
b) Wildlife revenues are, compared to other rural farm 
revenues, relatively easy to determine and tax. The 15 per 
cent levy or tax on communal production is an example. 
This could lead rural councils into the “easy" solution of 
maintaining this kind of tax on communal land producer 
communities and extending it to private farms and ranches. 
This however could perpetuate a situation in which wildlife 
production is differentially taxed making it an 
uncompetitive form of production for farmers in situations 
where intrinsically it is a sounder economic'and ecological 
form of land use. The Honorable Minister of Environment 
and Tourism sounded a warning on this point in his 1992 
speech to the A.G.M. of this Association when he said:
"In the implementation of this programme we should 
avoid the pitfall of making wildlife the only resource 
that can be used for District development. This is a 
point I would like to stress to avoid the temptation 
of levying or taxing wildlife while exempting cattle 
and crops. You will no doubt appreciate that this not 
only is discriminatory but also quite unfair.” (p.2)
The rural district council taxation system must therefore 
be devised to apply to all uses or revenues benefitting 
from RDC services on an equitable basis and in a manner 
which does not discriminate against any form of 
environmentally sound and economical!y.pr oductive land use.
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c) RDCs can help balance their budgets by shifting many of the 
wildlife management activities and costs that they have 
developed to the producer units. communal land producer 
units should be expected to take over and pay for 
management costs, just as private farms and ranches are 
expected to do. It is recognized that some coordinative 
and regulatory services in wildlife management, for both 
private and communal land, may be required from RDCs. For 
these services producer units should pay, according to 
their needs and on the basis of agreed schedules of fees.
8. Conclusion
This paper began with the quotation of the tsumo "Maunqa marema. 
kudva muti waaaere.11 1 : In meaning, this proverb is very much
like the English one which states, "Don't kill the goose which 
lays the golden eggs," To mix my metaphors, Zimbabwe's policy 
of giving rural people the right to manage and benefit from the 
wildlife with which they live has been the golden goose which, 
where implemented, has laid the golden eggs of a better 
environment, increased wildlife revenues and rural development. 
Like the maunga, we would be foolish to eat up the capital of our 
wildlife and the rural self-sufficiency that our policy is 
developing for the sake of short-term sectional or administrative 
needs. We would be eating up the environmental tree in which we 
live. Let us rather keep the flame of motivation and self- 
sufficiency which CAMPFIRE has kindled in our communal lands 
alive and growing.
M.W. Murphree. 
12/12/93
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Notes on tsumo quoted.
1. Mauncra marema - kudva muti maanocrara. ’’Hairy caterpillars 
are stupid, eating down the tree in which they live."
2. Kusiri kwako masanoo. "A place that is not yours isv wild 
bush," i.e. a place in which there is no point in wasting 
your labour or management efforts.
3. Mvura vokuchsrerwa haioedzi nvota. "Water that is fetched 
for you by someone else does not quench the thirst," i.e. 
people are frequently not satisfied with what is handed out 
to them by others. They may not get what they need nor be 
happy with being dependant on others.
4. Mweni haaiswi uadura,, "A stranger is not placed in the 
granary," i.e. there is no sense in letting others control 
the place where your resources are stored, and on which 
your livelihood depends. A colourful variant is diro 
harioinzwi mumunda. "a baboon is not led into one's field."
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